Section 2
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences, (sic) against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.(*1)
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. (*2)
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
Section 3
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed (*3), and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
Section 4
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. (*4)
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(*1) Debates about presidential pardon powers come up on a regular basis, but in some ways they are among the most misunderstood aspects of executive powers granted by the Constitution.
The President has pardon or clemency power under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, of the Constitution, under the Pardon Clause. The clause says the President “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” The Office of the Pardon Attorney, which is part of the Justice Department, has handled such matters for the President since 1893, and it has a detailed description of the pardon and clemency process on its website.
Although the terms clemency and pardon seemed to be interchangeable, in general terms executive federal clemency is granted after someone had allegedly committed a crime. In most cases, that person is convicted of a crime, and then granted a form of clemency. A pardon allows a convicted person to reclaim lost civil rights after a conviction.
In the case of former President Richard Nixon, he was granted a pardon by President Gerald Ford for any crimes he might have committed during the Watergate scandal, even though Nixon wasn’t charged with or convicted of federal crimes. (This is known as a pre-emptive pardon.)
The basis of the Presidential pre-emptive pardon was an 1866 Supreme Court ruling called Ex parte Garland, which allowed for a pardon granted by President Andrew Johnson to remain in force for a former Confederate politician.
And what about the question of President issuing a self-pardon? The exact question of self-pardoning wasn’t directly addressed at the Convention.
(*2) It is within the discretion of the Senate as to what action, if any, to take for a given nomination. Nowhere does the Constitution say that the Senate is required to act on the president’s nominations.
The Framers certainly didn’t understand the Senate to bear such an obligation. And the Framers who drafted that document certainly didn’t say that the Senate bore such an obligation.
But the best evidence of the Senate’s power not to vote on nominations is found in the Framers’ rejection of an alternative approach to appointments. As an alternative to the “advice and consent” model, James Madison proposed a discretionary Senate veto. Under that plan, a president’s nominees would automatically be appointed unless the Senate mustered a majority vote against that nomination within a fixed number of days.
In short, Madison would have put the burden on the Senate, to affirmatively act to block a nomination. But the Framers rejected his proposal, and chose instead the “advice and consent” model, placing the burden on the president (and his supporters) to convince the Senate to confirm his nominee.
(*3) This Clause does not grant power but rather imposes a duty: “The President … shall take Care…” This is not optional; it is mandatory.
The duty is personal. Execution of the laws may be delegated, but the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” is the President’s alone.
The President is not required to take care that the laws be “completely” executed; that would be impossible given finite resources. The President does have power to make enforcement choices — however, he must make them “faithfully.
Finally, it is important to remember the historical context of the clause: English kings had claimed the power to suspend laws unilaterally, but the Framers expressly rejected that practice. Here, the executive would be obliged to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.
(*4) President Gerald Ford is famous for saying that impeachable offenses are whatever Congress says they are. His statement may be more than just a cynical observation about the irrelevance of constitutional scholarship to D.C.
There is evidence that the Founding Fathers were intentionally vague.
Initially, the framers considered defining impeachable offenses as just “treason or bribery” (rather than the ultimate definition of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors”). They tacked on the additional phrase because George Mason worried that “treason or bribery” was insufficient for removing a president who began to display dictatorial tendencies.
The framers offered a squishy definition in faith that Congress would know an impeachable offense when it saw one. (It is also clear however that Madison, at least, was worried about making the definition too vague, because excessive vagueness means that the president serves “during the pleasure of the Senate.”) Sounds an awful lot like Madison was right,,, “we have to pass it so we can know what’s in it.”
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